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Abstract
We present a propositional modal logic WC, which includes a logical verum
constant ⊤ but does not have any propositional variables. Furthermore, the only
connectives in the language of WC are consistency-operators 〈α〉 for each ordinal
α. As such, we end up with a class-size logic. However, for all practical purposes,
we can consider restrictions of WC up to a given ordinal. Given the restrictive
signature of the language, the only formulas are iterated consistency statements,
which are called worms. The theorems of WC are all of the form A ⊢ B for
worms A and B. The main result of the paper says that the well-known strictly
positive logic RC, called Reflection Calculus, is a conservative extension of WC.
As such, our result is important since it is the ultimate step in stripping spurious
complexity off the polymodal provability logic GLP, as far as applications to
ordinal analyses are concerned. Indeed, it may come as a surprise that a logic as
weak as WC serves the purpose of computing something as technically involved
as the proof theoretical ordinals of formal mathematical theories.
Keywords: Provability logic, strictly positive logics, closed fragment, feasible frag-
ments, Reflection Calculus, ordinal notations.
1 Introduction
Quite some interest has arisen in feasible fragments of modal logics recently. One of
the common goals is to find fragments with good computational properties that still
maintain a decent amount of expressibility. Description logics and their applications to
database theory [1] are a good example of this.
The current paper also studies fragments of modal logic, but coming from a different
tradition. Our starting point is GLP: a polymodal version of Go¨del-Lo¨b’s provability
logic as introduced by Japaridze [17]. The logic GLP is a propositional modal logic
which in its simplest version has a modality for each natural number. Although this
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logic is known to be PSPACE-complete [20], it behaves rather ghastly. While complete
with respect to topological semantics [8], GLP is easily seen to be frame-incomplete.
The logic GLP has received a substantial amount of interest due to its applications
to ordinal analysis [2]. The variable-free fragment GLP0 of GLP actually suffices for
various purposes. Going from GLP to GLP0 is then a first weakening leading up to our
final system WC to be introduced below.
The reason why GLP0 is still suitably expressible lies in the fact that terms in it can
be read in various ways. One can conceive of these terms as consistency statements
or reflection principles. Furthermore, natural fragments of arithmetic are denoted by
terms. The simplest terms of GLP0 are iterated consistency statements, and they are
called worms due to their relation to the heroic worm battle [4]. The worms modulo
provable equivalence can be ordered, so that they can also be conceived of as ordinals
[14]. Apart from their interpretation as consistency statements, reflection principles,
fragments of arithmetic, or ordinals, worms also stand in an intimate relation with
Turing progressions [18]. All of these mathematical entities can be manipulated and
reasoned about within the rather simple modal logic GLP0.
Even though the logic GLP0 is already a substantial simplification with respect to
GLP, its decidability problem is still PSPACE-complete [19]. Furthermore, the problem
of frame incompleteness is still there, but the logic GLP0 does have a rather well behaved
universal model [9].
A next step in simplifying GLP0 arose by studying strictly positive fragments of GLP
and GLP0 by means of the so called reflection calculi RC and RC0 [10], [5], [6]. The
theorems of RC and RC0 are of the form ϕ ⊢ ψ, where the only connectives in ϕ and ψ
are conjunctions and consistency modalities. GLP is conservative over RC, in the sense
that for ϕ and ψ only using conjunctions and consistency operators, we have that ϕ ⊢ ψ
is provable in RC if and only if ϕ→ ψ is a theorem of GLP [10].
The reflection calculi are known to be very well-behaved. In particular, the problem
of frame-incompleteness is no longer there, and the decision problem is decidable in
polynomial time [10]. Yet, as far as applications to ordinal analysis are concerned, no
essential expressive power has been lost. Thus, the second step in our simplification
brings us from GLP0 to RC0.
Given the limited signature of RC0, its formulas are just built from diamonds, con-
junctions, and top. However, it is provable in RC0 that each of its formulas is equivalent
to a single worm [16]. As such, one may wonder if some decent axiomatization of the
worm fragment of RC0 exists that only uses worms and only proves statements of the
form A ⊢ B with A and B being worms. The current paper settles this question in the
positive, presenting a calculus WC that only manipulates worms, so that RC0, and thus
also GLP0, are conservative extensions of WC.
In the last two sections of the paper we dwell on semantics for WC. In particular we
see that although WC has the finite model property, any (moderately nice) universal
model for WC inherits much of the intrinsic complexity of Ignatiev’s universal model
for GLP0.
2
2 The Reflection Calculus
Given an ordinal Λ, the Reflection Calculus for Λ — we write RCΛ — is a propositional
sequent logic in a modal language that is strictly positive. The language is hence
composed of ⊤, variables, and closed both under the binary connective ∧, and the
unary modal operators 〈α〉 for each ordinal α < Λ.
Definition 2.1 (Reflection Calculus, RCΛ, [5]). Let ϕ, ψ and χ be formulas in the
language of RCΛ, and α, β < Λ be ordinals.
The axioms of RCΛ are:
1. ϕ ⊢RC ϕ and ϕ ⊢RC ⊤;
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢RC ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢RC ψ;
3. 〈α〉〈α〉ϕ ⊢RC 〈α〉ϕ;
4. 〈α〉ϕ ⊢RC 〈β〉ϕ for α > β;
5. 〈α〉ϕ ∧ 〈β〉ψ ⊢RC 〈α〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈β〉ψ
)
for α > β.
The rules are:
1. If ϕ ⊢RC ψ and ψ ⊢RC χ, then ϕ ⊢RC χ;
2. If ϕ ⊢RC ψ and ϕ ⊢RC χ, then ϕ ⊢RC ψ ∧ χ;
3. If ϕ ⊢RC ψ, then 〈α〉ϕ ⊢RC 〈α〉ψ.
If ϕ ⊢RC ψ, we say that ψ follows from ϕ in RC. If both ϕ ⊢RC ψ and ψ ⊢RC ϕ, we
say that ϕ and ψ are equivalent in RC, and write ϕ ≡RC ψ.
In this paper we are mainly interested in the closed fragment of RCΛ, denoted by
RC
0
Λ, which is the same as RCΛ without variables in the language. Since the following
results hold for any chosen Λ, we will omit it.
There are some inhabitants of RC0 on which we take special interest: the worms.
These are just the formulas of RC0 that have no ∧.
Definition 2.2 (Worms, W and Wα). Worms are inductively defined as follows: ⊤ is
in W; if A is in W and α is an ordinal, then 〈α〉A is in W.
Worms whose modalities are all at least α— we writeWα — are defined inductively
in a similar manner: ⊤ is in Wα; if A is in Wα and γ ≥ α is an ordinal, then 〈γ〉A is
in Wα.
It is a known result [16] that any formula in the language of RC0 is equivalent to a
worm.
Lemma 2.3. For each formula ϕ of RC0 there is a worm A such that ϕ ≡RC A.
This makes one wonder whether it would be possible to work with a calculus that
only involves worms as far as RC0 is concerned. This paper settles the question in the
positive.
3
3 The Worm Calculus
We propose a Worm Calculus — we write WC — which derives sequents of worms.
Since the language of WC only includes ⊤ and diamonds 〈α〉 for an ordinal α, we omit
the 〈·〉, obtaining formulas which are simply strings of ordinals ending in ⊤. To further
simplify, for the worms A⊤ and B⊤, we will write A and B. When we write AB this
is understood as AB⊤.
Definition 3.1 (Worm Calculus, WC). Let A,B and C be worms, and α, β be ordinals.
The axioms of WC are:
A1. A ⊢WC ⊤;
A2. ααA ⊢WC αA (Transitivity);
A3. αA ⊢WC βA for α > β (Monotonicity).
The rules of WC are:
R1. If A ⊢WC B and B ⊢WC C, then A ⊢WC C (Cut);
R2. If A ⊢WC B, then αA ⊢WC αB (Necessitation);
R3. If A ⊢WC B and A ⊢WC αC, then A ⊢WC BαC, for B ∈Wα+1.
If A ⊢WC B, we say that B follows from A in WC. If both A ⊢WC B and B ⊢WC A,
we say that A and B are equivalent in WC, and write A ≡WC B.
To express recursion and the notion of simplicity, we use a simple measure on worms,
their length. The length of a worm is the total number of symbols other than ⊤.
Definition 3.2 (Length). The length of a worm A — we write |A| — is defined recur-
sively as such: |⊤| := 0, and |αA| := |A|+ 1.
We can immediately prove some facts about worms using the worm calculus.
Lemma 3.3. For any worms A and B, we have that AB ⊢WC A.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of A. Starting from B ⊢ ⊤ (base
case), repeatedly apply Necessitation to build A up front.
From this lemma we obtain a simple but useful corollary.
Corollary 3.4. For any worm A, we have that A ⊢WC A.
It is in general not true that AB ⊢WC B, but there is a special case.
Lemma 3.5. For any ordinal α and worms A and B such that A ∈ Wα+1, we have
that AαB ⊢WC αB.
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Proof. By induction on the length of A, with the help of Transitivity and Monotonicity.
Lemma 3.6. For any non-trivial worm A ∈Wα, we have that A ⊢WC α.
Proof. By induction on the length of A. If |A| = 1, then A = β for some β ≥ α.
The result follows by Monotonicity and Corollary 3.4. For the induction step, consider
A = βA′, where β ≥ α and we already know A′ ⊢WC α. Then by Necessitation and
Transitivity, αA′ ⊢WC αα ⊢WC α. Since βA
′ ⊢WC αA
′, we are done.
It is easy to see that RC extends WC. As we shall later see, RC is conservative over
WC, which means that this extension is, in a sense, not proper. The first of these two
claims is articulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. For any two worms A and B we have that A ⊢WC B implies A ⊢RC B.
Proof. By an easy induction on the length of a WC proof. To see that Rule R3 is
admissible in RC, we use induction on the length of B and Axiom 5.
The proof of the converse is a bit more involved. We shall use the fact that an
implication between worms can be recursively broken down into implications between
simpler worms.
4 Decomposing worms
The notions of α-head and α-remainder are useful to break down worms into smaller
ones.
Definition 4.1 (α-head, α-remainder). Let A be a worm and α be an ordinal.
The α-head of A — we write hα(A) — is defined recursively as: hα(⊤) := ⊤,
hα(βA) := βhα(A) if β ≥ α, and hα(βA) := ⊤ if β < α.
Likewise, the α-remainder of A — we write rα(A) — is defined recursively as:
rα(⊤) := ⊤, rα(βA) := rα(A) if β ≥ α, and rα(βA) := βA if β < α.
Intuitively, the α-head of A is the greatest initial segment of A which is in Wα,
and the α-remainder is what remains after cutting off the α-head. It then follows that
A = hα(A)rα(A), for every worm A and ordinal α. An immediate consequence is that
the lengths of the α-head and of the α-remainder of a worm are always at most the
length of the worm itself.
It is possible to prove that A ≡RC hα(A) ∧ rα(A) for every worm A and ordinal α.
In WC we cannot state such a result due to the lack of the conjunction connective in
the language. We can, however, obtain the same consequences.
Lemma 4.2. Let A be a worm and α be an ordinal. Then:
1. A ⊢WC hα(A);
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2. A ⊢WC rα(A);
3. If B ⊢WC hα(A) and B ⊢WC rα(A), then B ⊢WC A.
Proof. Note that A = hα(A)rα(A), this is to say, they are syntactically the same. Thus,
Part (i) follows from Lemma 3.3. Part (ii) is a consequence of Lemma 3.5, taking into
consideration that hα(A) ∈Wα and that rα(A) always starts with either ⊤ — making
the result trivial — or with an ordinal less than α. Part (iii) follows from rule R3 unless
rα(A) = ⊤, in which case it is trivial.
There is another relevant part of a worm, the α-body. It is obtained from the
(α + 1)-remainder by dropping its leftmost modality (as long as said remainder is not
trivial).
Definition 4.3 (α-body). Let A be a worm and α an ordinal. The α-body of A — we
write bα(A) — is defined from rα+1(A) as follows: if rα+1(A) = ⊤ then bα(A) := ⊤, and
if rα+1(A) = βB then bα(A) := B.
The α-body of a non-trivial worm A is particularly useful because its length is always
strictly smaller than the length of A. We can also prove a counterpart of Lemma 4.2
about the α-body.
Lemma 4.4. Let α be an ordinal and A be a non-trivial worm in Wα. Then:
1. A ⊢WC αbα(A);
2. If B ⊢WC hα+1(A) and B ⊢WC αbα(A), then B ⊢WC hα+1(A)αbα(A);
3. hα+1(A)αbα(A) ⊢WC A;
4. A ≡WC hα+1(A)αbα(A).
Proof. We make a case distinction on rα+1(A) in order to prove Parts (i) to (iii) sepa-
rately in each case.
Suppose that rα+1(A) = βbα(A) for some ordinal β. Since A ∈ Wα, then β ≥ α.
But since it is in the (α+1)-remainder, β < α+1. We conclude that β = α, and hence
that rα+1(A) = αbα(A). Then Parts (i) to (iii) are just a corollary of Lemma 4.2.
However it can be the case that rα+1(A) = ⊤ and hence bα(A) = ⊤ as well. Then
Part (i) becomes an instance of Lemma 3.6, Part (ii) follows from Rule R3 and Part
(iii) is a consequence of Lemma 3.3.
Finally, Part (iv) is a corollary of all of the other parts put together.
The following result is Lemma 3.15 of [14]. It describes part of a recursive decision
procedure for provability in RC between worms.
Lemma 4.5. For any two worms A and B and for any ordinal α we have that A ⊢RC αB
if and only if both hα(A) ⊢RC αhα(B) and A ⊢RC rα(B).
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Let us see that we can prove one of the implications in WC, which we will later use
in the proof of our main theorem (Theorem 6.1). There is no a priori reason why the
other implication can’t also hold; in fact, we will see that it does, since the calculi are
equivalent for worms. It just so happens that we have no use for it.
Lemma 4.6. For any two worms A and B, and for any ordinal α, if we have that
hα(A) ⊢WC αhα(B) and A ⊢WC rα(B), then we have A ⊢WC αB.
Proof. Taking into consideration that A = hα(A)rα(A) and similarly for B, consider
two cases. In the first case, rα(B) = ⊤, and this is a consequence of Lemma 4.2. In the
second case, rα(B) = βC for some β < α and worm C. Then the result follows from
Rule R3.
We now want to prove that RC is conservative over WC using the following inductive
strategy. If A ⊢RC B, we use Lemma 4.5 to recast this into a collection of provability
statements in RC between worms with smaller lengths. We then translate them to
WC using the induction hypothesis, and finally go back with the help of Lemma 4.6.
However, depending on the worms A and B, it could be the case that these two theorems
are not enough, since they don’t always reduce the length of the provability statements.
In what follows, we introduce some more useful notions and results, which will help us
deal with that problem.
5 Well founded orders on worms
It is possible to define an order relation between worms as is standard in the literature.
Definition 5.1 (Ordering worms). We say that A <α B if B ⊢WC αA. Furthermore,
we say that A ≤α B if either A <α or A ≡WC B. The provability can be taken in RC
to obtain <RCα and ≤
RC
α , respectively.
It is well-known that <RCα is irreflexive [7]. Since WC is embedded in RC, we also
know that <α is irreflexive. It is easy to see that both relations are transitive.
Our goal now is to show that <α is a total relation over worms inWα. This has been
shown for <RCα using worm normal forms [7], but here we follow a different strategy,
proposed in [11]. We start by presenting a number of useful sufficient conditions to
deduce A <α B, and one to deduce A ≡ B.
Lemma 5.2. Let A,B ∈Wα such that A,B 6= ⊤. Then in WC (and hence in RC) we
have the following:
1. If bα(B) ⊢ A, then A <α B;
2. If A <α bα(B), then A <α B;
3. If bα(A) <α B and hα+1(A) <α+1 hα+1(B), then A <α+1 B (and consequently
A <α B);
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4. If bα(A) <α B and bα(B) <α A and hα+1(A) ≡ hα+1(B), then A ≡ B.
Proof. For the first item, from bα(B) ⊢ A we get by Necessitation that αbα(B) ⊢ αA.
Since by Lemma 4.4 we know that B ⊢ αbα(B), we can conclude that B ⊢ αA. The
second item follows by the transitivity of <α, taking into account that bα(B) <α B
(Lemma 4.4.(i)). The third item follows from Lemma 4.6. Finally, for the fourth item
we use B ⊢ αbα(A) and hα+1(B) ⊢ hα+1(A) to get B ⊢ hα+1(A)αbα(A), and hence
B ⊢ A. Then we obtain A ⊢ B in the same way.
Now we are ready to prove the totality of <α for worms in Wα.
Lemma 5.3 (Trichotomy, [11]). Given worms A,B ∈Wα, we have that either A <α B,
or A ≡ B, or B <α A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of AB. If the length is zero, i.e., if
A = B = ⊤, then clearly A ≡ B.
Note that by Lemma 3.6, ⊤ <α C regardless of the worm C ∈ Wα, as long as
C 6= ⊤. Then if exactly one of A,B is ⊤ we have also solved our problem.
Now for the induction step, take both A and B with positive length. Our induction
hypothesis is:
For any ordinal β and worms C,D ∈ Wβ such that |CD| < |AB|, we have
C <β D, or C ≡ D, or D <β C.
Let ξ be the minimum ordinal in AB, which means that α ≤ ξ. According to Lemma
5.2, if A ≤ξ bξ(B) or B ≤ξ bξ(A), we can conclude A <ξ B or B <ξ A, respectively.
Assume then that A 6≤ξ bξ(B) and B 6≤ξ bξ(A). Since we took A 6= ⊤, it is clear
that |bξ(A)| < |A|, and analogously for B. Then by the induction hypothesis, we have
bξ(B) <ξ A and bξ(A) <ξ B.
Since we are assuming ξ is in AB, we also know that
|hξ+1(A)hξ+1(B)| < |AB|,
and thus by the induction hypothesis we have
hξ+1(A) <ξ+1 hξ+1(B), or
hξ+1(B) <ξ+1 hξ+1(A), or
hξ+1(A) ≡ hξ+1(B).
In the first two cases we use Lemma 5.2 again to conclude A <ξ B or B <ξ A respec-
tively. In the last case we can use the same lemma to get A ≡ B.
As a final remark, we observe that since α ≤ ξ, we have that C <ξ D implies
C <α D for any worms C,D ∈Wξ.
With the totality of <α at hand, we can already show that proofs in RC and WC
are equivalent for certain worms.
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Theorem 5.4. If A,B ∈Wα, then:
A <α B ⇐⇒ A <
RC
α B;
A ≡WC B ⇐⇒ A ≡RC B.
Proof. Both left-to-right implications are a consequence of RC extending WC (Theorem
3.7).
For the right-to-left implication of the first statement, we reason as follows: suppose
that A <RCα B but it is not the case that A <α B. Then by the totality of <α for worms
in Wα (Lemma 5.3), either B <α A, or A ≡WC B. By the inclusion of WC in RC,
we then conclude that either B <RCα A, or A ≡RC B. But neither of these two cases
is possible, as they contradict the irreflexivity of <RCα . Then it must be the case that
A <α B. The proof of the second statement is analogous.
6 Conservativity of RC over WC
We are now ready to prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 6.1. For any worms A and B′, if A ⊢RC B
′, then also A ⊢WC B
′.
Proof. If B′ = ⊤, the result is immediate. Assume then that B′ = αB for some ordinal
α and worm B.
The proof proceeds by complete induction on the length of AαB. The minimum
length of AαB is 1, and it occurs only when A = B = ⊤. But the premise ⊤ ⊢RC α
is absurd since it would contradict the irreflexivity of <RCα , and hence there is nothing
left to prove.
For the induction step, note that our induction hypothesis is the following:
For any worms C,D such that |CD| < |AαB| and C ⊢RC D, we have that
C ⊢WC D.
Assume that A ⊢RC αB. From Lemma 4.5 we get hα(A) ⊢RC αhα(B) and A ⊢RC rα(B).
Consider the following cases:
1. rα(A) 6= ⊤ or rα(B) 6= ⊤.
Then, since |A| = |hα(A)| + |rα(A)| (and equivalently for B), we know that
|hα(A)| < |A| or |hα(B)| < |B|. Then |hα(A)αhα(B)| < |AαB|. Furthermore,
|Arα(B)| < |AαB|. By using the induction hypothesis twice we get hα(A) ⊢WC
αhα(B) and A ⊢WC rα(B), which is enough to show A ⊢WC αB by Lemma 4.6.
2. rα(A) = ⊤ and rα(B) = ⊤.
In this case, we know that A,B ∈ Wα, and hence that A ⊢WC αB by Theorem
5.4.
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The proof of the preceding result (together with the proofs of the results it uses) gives
us a constructive algorithm to decide whether A ⊢WC B. Furthermore, if indeed A ⊢WC
B, this algorithm provides a list of syntactical steps which form a formal proof. Since
at each iteration of the recursion we may need to decide several different statements
with only slightly smaller lengths, the algorithm is exponential. It is known that there
is a polynomial procedure to decide RC [10] (and hence, as we’ve seen, WC), but it uses
semantics. Finding a polynomial syntactical algorithm remains an open problem.
Combining Theorems 3.7 and 6.1, we obtain the promised result: RC is a conserva-
tive extension of WC.
Theorem 6.2. For any worms A and B we have that A ⊢RC B if and only if A ⊢WC B.
Combining this theorem with Lemma 2.3 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.3. Let ϕ and ψ be closed RC-formulas with corresponding worms A and
B such that ϕ ≡RC A and ψ ≡RC B. Then we have ϕ ⊢RC ψ if and only if A ⊢WC B.
7 Relational semantics and Ignatiev’s model
Let us briefly recall how we arrived at the calculus WC while we comment on the rela-
tional semantics for the intermediate steps. Japaridze went from the regular provability
logic GL to its polymodal version GLP. Whereas GL is frame-complete, it turned out
that GLP is frame incomplete. Ignatiev intensively studied the closed fragment GLP0
and — although the frame incompleteness is still salient — introduced a universal model
I for it. Ignatiev’s model I is essentially infinite, having fractal features.
Dashkov and Beklemishev studied reflection calculi and in particular the strictly
positive fragments RC and RC0 of GLP and GLP0, respectively. Here the only connectives
are the diamond modalities together with conjunctions. The reflection calculi are known
to be frame complete and have the finite model property. Furthermore, linear frames
(xRy and xRz imply y = z, yRz or zRy) suffice for the closed fragment [11].
In this paper we perform a final simplification on RC0, getting rid of the conjunctions
to end up with WC. Inspired by the finite model property of RC0 and whence of WC,
in the last section of this paper we question whether WC may have a universal model
U that is significantly simpler than Ignatiev’s model I. We settle the answer to this
question with a yes and a no.
Yes, U can be simpler in that we can bound the length of the strict chains of
successors in U by ω. For this, it suffices to take the disjoint union of all finite RC0
counter models for all statements for which A 0 B. This clearly defines a universal
model for RC0 with only finite strict Rα-chains whereas, as we shall see below, the
model I has arbitrarily long strict Rα-chains. On the other hand, we shall see that for
a large class of universal models U , they inherit much of the intrinsic complexity of I
in that for infinitely many essentially different points x ∈ I we can find corresponding
points y ∈ U such that x and y have the same modal theory.
Before we can make this statement precise, we need a couple of technical definitions
that allow us to describe Ignatiev’s model I. As a first step, we need to define the
end-logarithm ℓ as a function from the ordinals to the ordinals by stipulating ℓ(0) := 0
and ℓ(α + ωβ) := β. Next, we need to define iterates of ℓ — the hyper-logarithms —
and write ℓξ to denote the ξ-th iterate of ℓ. We define:
1. ℓ0 := id,
2. ℓ1 := ℓ and,
3. ℓα+β := ℓβ ◦ ℓα.
Clearly, these three properties do not tell us anything about ℓξ for an additively
indecomposable ξ. To fix that, we will use the notion of initial function. An initial
function on the ordinals is a function that maps initial segments [0, . . . , α] onto initial
segments [0, . . . , β].
We now further require that each ℓξ is point-wise maximal among all families of
initial ordinal functions {f ξ}ξ∈On that satisfy the three properties. In this way, clearly
each f ξ defines an initial function. For the purposes of this paper, many of the exact
details of the ℓξ functions are irrelevant and we refer the interested reader to [13] or
[12] for further details.
Let us, by way of example, compute the first couple of values of ℓω. Recall that as
always, εζ denotes the ζ-th fixpoint of x 7→ ω
x. Since the initial segment [0] should be
mapped onto an initial segment, it must be that ℓω(0) = 0. If α < ε0 then it is easy
to see that for some n < ω we have that ℓn(α) = 0. Consequently, ℓω(α) = ℓn+ω(α) =
ℓω ◦ ℓn(α) = ℓω(0) = 0. Consequently, each initial segment [0, . . . , α] for α < ε0 will be
mapped by ℓω to the initial segment [0].
What about ℓω(ε0)? If we disregard the requirement on initiality, it is not hard to
see that ℓω(ε0) could be any value. However, since ℓ
ω should map the initial segment
[0, . . . , ε0] to an initial segment, the maximal possible value doing so requires that
ℓω(ε0) = 1.
We observe that ℓω(ξ+ ζ) = ℓ1+ω(ξ+ ζ) = ℓω ◦ ℓ(ξ+ ζ) = ℓω ◦ ℓ(ζ) = ℓ1+ω(ζ) = ℓω(ζ)
so that ℓω(ε0 + α) = 0 for any α < ε0.
Following this kind of arguments, we can now see that the next value where ℓω
increases will be at ε1 and ℓ
ω(ε1) = 2. Fortunately, we do not need to prove tons
of theorems any time we are required to know some value of ℓα(β) and in [12, 13] a
recursive algorithm is presented to compute these values:
Proposition 7.1. For ordinals ξ, ζ , the following recursion is well-defined and deter-
mines all the ℓξ(ζ) values:
1. ℓ0(α) = α,
2. ℓξ(0) = 0,
3. ℓ1(α + ωβ) = β,
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4. ℓω
ρ+ξ = ℓξ ◦ ℓω
ρ
provided that ξ < ωρ + ξ,
5. ℓω
ρ
(ζ) = ℓω
ρ
(ℓη(ζ)) if ρ > 0 and η < ωρ is such that ℓη(ζ) < ζ ,
6. ℓω
ρ
(ζ) = sup
δ∈[0,ζ)
(ℓω
ρ
(δ) + 1) if ρ > 0 and ζ = ℓη(ζ) for all η < ωρ.
Now that the hyper-logarithms have been defined, we can specify the points of
Ignatiev’s model I which are the so-called ℓ-sequences.
Definition 7.2 (ℓ-sequence). An ℓ-sequence is a function f : On → On such that for
each ordinal ζ we have f(ζ) ≤ ℓ−ξ+ζ
(
f(ξ)
)
for ξ < ζ large enough.
At times we shall write fξ instead of f(ξ). We note that for each ℓ-sequence f the
inequality f(α+1) ≤ ℓ
(
f(α)
)
holds. Furthermore, the requirement of ξ < ζ being large
enough is important, as it means that f = 〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉 is an ℓ-sequence,
where f(0) = ωε0+1, f(i) = ε0 for 0 < i < ω, f(ω) = 1 and f(i) = 0 for i > ω. It is
easy to see that ℓω(ωε0+1) = 0 and ℓω(ε0) = 1. Then f(ω) ≤ ℓ
ω
(
f(1)
)
but it is not the
case that f(ω) ≤ ℓω
(
f(0)
)
.
We can now define the class-size version of Ignatiev’s model as the collection of
all ℓ-sequences with suitable relations Rξ to model each of the 〈ξ〉 modalities. For all
practical purposes we can take sufficiently large set-size truncations of the class-size
model.
Definition 7.3 (Ignatiev’s model). Ignatiev’s model is I := 〈I, {Rξ}ξ∈On〉, where I is
the collection of all ℓ-sequences and fRξg if both f(α) = g(α) for α < ξ and f(ξ) > g(ξ).
For example, we can see that
〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 0, 0 . . .〉 R0 〈ε0, ε0, ε0, . . . 0, 0 . . .〉,
〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉 R0 〈ε0, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉,
〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉 Rω 〈ω
ε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 0, 0 . . .〉,
but ¬
(
〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉 Rω 〈ε0, ε0, ε0, . . . 0, 0 . . .〉
)
.
The relation I, x  ϕ is defined as usual, where we omit the mention of the model
I: x  ⊤; x  ϕ ∧ ψ :⇔ x  ϕ and x  ψ; x  ¬ϕ :⇔ x 6 ϕ; and finally, x  〈ξ〉ϕ :⇔
there is a y s.t. xRξy and y  ϕ.
Theorem 7.4 ([13]). GLP0 is sound and complete with respect to Ignatiev’s model,
that is GLP0 ⊢ ϕ if and only if ∀x ∈ I x  ϕ.
We now define an important subset of I that has rather nice properties.
Definition 7.5 (Main axis, MA). By MA we denote the main axis of Ignatiev’s model
I and define it as such: f ∈ MA :⇔ ∀ζ ∀ ξ<ζ f(ζ) = ℓ−ξ+ζ(f(ξ)).
For example, 〈ωε0+1, ε0, ε0, . . . 1, 0 . . .〉 is not on the main axis, whereas 〈ω
ε0+1, ε0 +
1, 0 . . . 0, 0 . . .〉 is. One of the nice properties of the main axis is that each point on it is
modally definable. We refer the reader to [13] for a proof of the following.
Lemma 7.6. For each x ∈ MA there is a worm A such that I, y  A ∧ [0]¬A if and
only if x = y. Moreover, each worm A defines a point at the main axis via A ∧ [0]¬A.
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8 On universal models for WC
The current proof of the main result of this section does not hold for any universal
model but only for models that satisfy an additional natural condition. Let us recall
that in the context of provability logics, a model is called Euclidean whenever xRαy
and xRβz imply yRβz for β < α. Furthermore, by Th(x) we denote the collection of
worms {A | x  A}. Now we are able to state the main result.
Theorem 8.1. Let U be a Euclidean universal model for WC. We have that for each
point x ∈ I with x ∈ MA, there is some y ∈ U such that Th(x) = Th(y).
Proof. Let x ∈ MA be arbitrary and let A be the worm given by Lemma 7.6 such that
A ∧ [0]¬A is true at x and nowhere else. Since A 0WC 0A, we can find y ∈ U with
U , y  A and U , y 1 0A. We shall show that for this particular choice of y we have
Th(x) = Th(y).
First, we assume that I, x  B for some worm B. By the definability of x and the
completeness of I, we know that GLP ⊢ A ∧ [0]¬A → B. By Lemma 8.3, which we
prove below, and the conservativity of GLP over WC, we may conclude that actually
A ⊢WC B, and hence U , y  B.
Now assume that I, x 1 B for some worm B. Then GLP 0 A → B, which means
that A 0WC B. Let C be a worm equivalent to A∧B. Clearly, by the trichotomy of <0
and since A 0WC B and A 0RC 〈0〉(A ∧ B), we have that A <0 C, whence C ⊢WC 0A.
We assume for a contradiction that U , y  B. In that case, since also U , y  A, we may
conclude by Lemma 8.5 below that U , y  C. But since C ⊢WC 0A, this would mean
that U , y  0A which is a contradiction by our choice of y.
We finish the paper by proving the two critical lemmas that were needed in the above
proof, together with some auxiliary observations. First we define a relation y  x on I
as y being point-wise at least x, that is, y  x if and only if for all ξ we have yξ ≥ xξ.
The following lemma tells us that this relation, together with the point x where a worm
A is true for the first time, characterizes all the points where A holds.
Lemma 8.2. Let A be a worm and x, y ∈ I. We have that
x  A =⇒
(
y  x =⇒ y  A
)
;
x  A ∧ [0]¬A =⇒
(
y  x ⇐⇒ y  A
)
.
Proof. During this proof we make use of a specific operation on ℓ-sequences: for an
ordinal α and ℓ-sequences f and g, we define α(f, g) to be the ordinal sequence such
that α(f, g)ζ = fζ for ζ < α and α(f, g)ζ = gζ for ζ ≥ α. Clearly, whenever gα ≤ fα,
we have that α(f, g) is again an ℓ-sequence.
The first item is proven by an easy induction on A. It was already observed as
Lemma 2.4.3. of [15]. Note also that the =⇒ direction of the second item follows from
the first one.
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For the⇐= direction of the second item, we fix x such that x  A∧ [0]¬A, consider
y such that y  A, and assume for a contradiction that y 6 x. Let ξ be the smallest
ordinal such that yξ < xξ. Then it is easy to see that xRξξ(x, y).
We will set out to prove the following claim: for any worm B and any ℓ-sequences
f and g with fα > gα we have that if f  B and g  B, then α(f, g)  B.
Clearly the result follows from the claim, as it would imply that ξ(x, y)  A, and
hence that x  〈ξ〉A. Consequently, also x  〈0〉A, which contradicts the assumption
that x  [0]¬A.
We prove the claim by induction on B with the base case being trivial. Thus we
consider the inductive case where B = 〈ζ〉C assuming f  〈ζ〉C and g  〈ζ〉C.
In the case where ζ < α, we see that for any w such that fRζw, we also have
α(f, g)Rζw, which tells us that α(f, g)  〈ζ〉C.
In the case where ζ ≥ α, we find w and w′ such that fRζw  C and gRζw
′
 C.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that α(w,w′)  C. But since α(f, g)Rζα(w,w
′),
we see that α(f, g)  〈ζ〉C as was to be shown.
With this characterization lemma, we can easily prove the following admissible rule.
Lemma 8.3. Let A and B be worms such that GLP ⊢ A ∧ [0]¬A→ B. Then we have
that GLP ⊢ A→ B.
Proof. Given A, let x be the unique ℓ-sequence where A ∧ [0]¬A holds. Clearly, since
GLP ⊢ A ∧ [0]¬A → B, we also have that x  B. We prove that for any y, if y  A,
then y  B, from which the result follows by completeness. By the previous lemma, if
y  A, then y  x. But then, using the previous lemma again, we may conclude that
y  B.
The next two lemmas relate to conjunctions and models of WC.
Lemma 8.4. Let U be a Euclidean universal model for WC and x ∈ U . Then, if x  A
with A ∈Wα+1 and x  αB, it also holds that x  AαB.
Proof. By induction on the length of A with the base case being trivial. For the
inductive case, suppose that x  γA for some γ > α, and that x  αB. Then there
is y ∈ U such that xRγy and y  A. Likewise, there is z ∈ U such that xRαz and
z  B. Since U is Euclidean, we know that yRαz, and hence by induction hypothesis
that y  AαB. Then clearly x  γAαB.
With this lemma at hand we can show that although a Euclidean WC-model U
cannot speak directly about conjunctions, it can indirectly do so.
Lemma 8.5. Let U be a Euclidean universal model for WC and x ∈ U . Let A,B and
C be worms such that A ∧ B ≡RC C. Then we have x  A and x  B if and only if
x  C.
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Proof. The right-to-left direction is trivial. The left-to-right direction follows by induc-
tion on the number of different symbols of AB (the width of AB) following the standard
proof that worms are closed under conjunctions (Lemma 9 of [3] and Corollary 4.13 of
[7]). The base case is trivial. For the induction step, let α be the minimal modality of
AB. We know by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4 that x  hα+1(A), x  αbα(A), x  hα+1(B),
and x  αbα(B). Let D be provably equivalent to hα+1(A) ∧ hα+1(B). Then, since
there is no α in the (α + 1)-heads of A and B, we know that x  D by the induc-
tion hypothesis. By Corollary 4.12 of [7], we know that either αbα(A) ⊢ αbα(B) or
αbα(B) ⊢ αbα(A). Let αE be the maximum. We obtain x  DαE by Lemma 8.4, and
clearly DαE ≡RC A ∧B.
We conclude by observing that all the results proven about universal (Euclidean)
models of WC also hold for universal (Euclidean) models of RC0. It remains to see
whether we can prove the same results for non-Euclidean models.
References
[1] Artale, A., Calvanese, D., Kontchakov, R., & Zakharyaschev, M. (2009). The
DL-Lite family and relations. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 36 , 1–69.
[2] Beklemishev, L. D. (2004). Provability algebras and proof-theoretic ordinals, I.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 128 , 103–124.
[3] Beklemishev, L. D. (2005). Veblen hierarchy in the context of provability alge-
bras. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Twelfth
International Congress , (pp. 65–78). Kings College Publications.
[4] Beklemishev, L. D. (2006). The worm principle. In Z. Chatzidakis, P. Koepke, &
W. Pohlers (Eds.) Logic Colloquium 2002, Lecture Notes in Logic 27 , (pp. 75–95).
ASL Publications.
[5] Beklemishev, L. D. (2012). Calibrating provability logic: From modal logic to
Reflection Calculus. In T. Bolander, T. Braner, T. S. Ghilardi, & L. Moss (Eds.)
Advances in Modal Logic 9 , (pp. 89–94). London: College Publications.
[6] Beklemishev, L. D. (2014). Positive provability logic for uniform reflection princi-
ples. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 165 (1), 82–105.
[7] Beklemishev, L. D., Fernndez-Duque, D., & Joosten, J. J. (2014). On provability
logics with linearly ordered modalities. Studia Logica, 102 (541).
[8] Beklemishev, L. D., & Gabelaia, D. (2013). Topological completeness of the prov-
ability logic GLP. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 164 (12), 1201–1223.
15
[9] Beklemishev, L. D., Joosten, J. J., & Vervoort, M. (2005). A finitary treatment of
the closed fragment of Japaridze’s provability logic. Journal of Logic and Compu-
tation, 15 (4), 447–463.
[10] Dashkov, E. V. (2012). On the positive fragment of the polymodal provability logic
GLP. Mathematical Notes , 91 (3-4), 318–333.
[11] Ferna´ndez-Duque, D. (2017). Worms and spiders: Reflection calculi and ordinal
notation systems. IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and their Applications , 4 (10), 3277–
3356.
[12] Ferna´ndez-Duque, D., & Joosten, J. J. (2013). Hyperations, Veblen progressions
and transfinite iteration of ordinal functions. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
164 , 785–801.
[13] Ferna´ndez-Duque, D., & Joosten, J. J. (2013). Models of transfinite provability
logic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 78 (2), 543–561.
[14] Ferna´ndez-Duque, D., & Joosten, J. J. (2014). Well-orders in the transfinite
Japaridze algebra. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 22 (6), 933–963.
[15] Icard, T. (2008). Models of the Polymodal Provability Logic. Master’s thesis,
Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[16] Ignatiev, K. N. (1993). On strong provability predicates and the associated modal
logics. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 58 , 249–290.
[17] Japaridze, G. K. (1988). The polymodal provability logic. In Intensional logics and
logical structure of theories: material from the fourth Soviet-Finnish symposium on
logic, Telavi, May 20–24, 1985 , (pp. 16–48). Metsniereba. (In Russian).
[18] Joosten, J. J. (2016). Turing-Taylor expansions for arithmetic theories. Studia
Logica, 104 (6), 1225–1243.
[19] Pakhomov, F. (2014). On the complexity of the closed fragment of Japaridze’s
provability logic. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 53 (7–8), 949–967.
[20] Shapirovsky, I. (2008). PSPACE-decidability of Japaridze’s polymodal logic. In
C. Areces, & R. Goldblatt (Eds.) Advances in Modal Logic 7 , (pp. 289–304). Col-
lege Publications.
16
